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The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) – a subsidy mechanism can incentivize neighboring 
landowners to spatially coordinate their land use decisions for effective provision of 
ecosystem services such as biodiversity protection. In this paper we explore individual AB 
performance on a local network in a laboratory setting. In our experiments, we vary the local 
network size while keeping the number of neighbors for each player same. Results suggest 
better AB performance and greater spatial coordination in smaller groups relative to bigger 
ones. In bigger groups however we observe localized areas of coordinated land use choices 
which indicate partial AB effectiveness.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Ecosystem services such as biodiversity protection, improvement in water quality, 
reduction in soil erosion and many others can be supplied by bringing about changes in 
private land uses. These changes are costly indicating that property owners have to be 
financially compensated for implementing them. Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
schemes have been formulated by regulatory agencies for this purpose. Notable examples of 
PES schemes include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US and the 
Stewardship Scheme in the UK. One key issue which is receiving increasing attention in the 
implementation of these payment schemes is how to incentivize the creation of spatially 
contiguous areas of similar land uses on private properties. This spatial goal is relevant to the 
delivery of biodiversity protection services such as increase in the population of species with 
limited mobility like amphibians, natural pollinators who provide pollination services on 
agricultural land to mention a few (Margules and Pressey 2000, Willis 1979, Bartelt et al. 
2010).  
One approach to creating these spatial patterns is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) 
proposed by Parkhurst et al. (2002, 2007).  The AB is a subsidy mechanism consisting of two 
incentive payments.  The first is a participation payment and is independent of neighbors’ 
actions and is received by landowners who choose to participate and implement designated 
conservation practices. The second is the bonus paid when enrolled parcels border those 
enrolled by others. The format of the AB is flexible and the payments can be adjusted to 
incentivize the creation of various land use patterns . Under this mechanism since landowners 
can obtain the full payment only if they coordinate their land management decisions with 
their neighbors, inter-neighbor interactions take the form of a coordination game. These 
games have multiple Nash equilibria which are Pareto ranked in their payoffs and hence 
differ in their efficiency properties. Selection of any of the Nash equilibria other than the 
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Pareto efficient one is economically inefficient and corresponds to the scenario of 
coordination failure. There is an extensive theoretical and experimental literature on 
equilibrium selection and coordination failure in these games. In the context of the AB non-
participation and inability to coordinate decisions on a square spatial grid leads to 
coordination failure. Repeated interactions which builds reputation and reduce the strategic 
uncertainty in the game (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007) and non-binding pre-play 
communication between players (Warziniack et al. 2008) are found to improve the likelihood 
of coordination in the AB game in an experimental environment.  
In our paper, we are interested in exploring the coordination features of the AB 
scheme and the equilibrium selection process as well. We pursue this objective with a 
modified AB in a new game environment which is representative of strategic interactions 
between landowners on agricultural landscapes where the AB can be implemented. The 
modified AB scheme includes two strategies pertaining to the supply of two types of 
ecosystem services in addition to the opt-out alternative.  This strategy set reformulation  is 
based on the fact that land can deliver different types of ecosystem services.  
Our new game environment is prompted by landscape features which can  impact the 
strategic interactions in the coordination game affect AB performance. Depending upon the 
nature of property boundaries and the total area under the jurisdiction of the regulator there 
may be few or many farms who are eligible to participate in the AB program. Van Huyck, 
Battalio and Beil (1990, 2007) (VHBB) have found that the incidence of coordination failure 
is greater in games with more players. Given this result, we experimentally evaluate the 
impact of varying the number of AB participants on the landscape on spatial coordination and 
AB performance. We consider small and large landscape grids with six and twelve players 
respectively arranged in a circular network. The circle specification is relevant to our study 
for two reasons. First, while the work of VHBB and others have shown that groups larger 
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than 3 or 4 almost always fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium; they also find that 
small groups of 2 or 3 often manage to coordinate successfully. Therefore, the circle network 
structure presents an interesting middle ground. Since all the players are indirectly connected 
in the network inefficient coordination may be expected if the network has more than three 
players. However, players only directly interact with a small set of neighbors - two (one to 
the left and right each) so the small size of their immediate interactions may lend hope for 
successful coordination. Second the circle network allows us to consider a landscape where 
neighbors' neighbors are not a player's neighbor. This neighborhood pattern is distinct from 
the more traditional global interaction setup where every individual directly interacts with 
everyone else. Yet it is representative of neighborhood linkages between landowners which 
are determined by geography and where the identity of neighbors of every landowner may 
vary. These circular networks are referred to as local networks (Cassar 2007, Weidenholzer 
2010). In our experiments on AB performance, we vary the overall network size (between 6 
and 12) but keep the number of direct neighbors the same at 2 in all sessions. This size 
treatment allows us to inspect the incidence of coordination in the context of the AB and also 
evaluate the generality of the VHBB result in local networks.  
The laboratory experimental method is appropriate to our study for various reasons. 
First, by controlling the features of the laboratory environment or testbed (Plott 1997), we are 
able to wind-tunnel test the performance of the AB in new strategic environments prior to 
costly field testing. Second, by using human subjects we can analyze human behavior in local 
networks in addition to performance of the AB scheme. Finally, the experimental approach 
allows us to evaluate the performance of the AB instrument in a strategic environment which 
has policy relevance.  
 Our experiments demonstrate that there is greater incidence of spatial coordination 
failure through the selection of the inefficient equilibrium in the large local network relative 
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to the small one. This difference is significant despite individuals having two neighbors in 
both the treatments. In addition we also find that many players frequently fail to converge to 
any equilibrium strategy. This scenario of mis-coordination gives rise to hubs of players 
choosing different strategies at different parts of the networks. These hubs are more prevalent 
in the large networks relative to the small ones and limit the payoffs of players at the hubs' 
edges, economic efficiency and AB performance.  
 The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we describe the AB game and relate it 
to the existing literature on coordination games In network and non-network settings. Section 
3 describes the experimental design followed by the Results in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
Section 2: The Agglomeration Bonus Game 
 We present the structure of a general AB coordination game with N players on the 
landscape. We consider every player’s property to have two parcels.1 These parcels can 
deliver two different types of ecosystem services. Thus rather than looking at the creation of 
different spatial patterns we focus on the provision of two types of ecosystem services via 
spatially contiguous land uses. A parcel can also be placed in conventional land use indicating 
non-participation in the AB scheme. Let   represent parcel type and take the value of M or K. 
The participation component of the AB scheme is denoted by      and the bonus by     . 
The bonus is received when neighbors produce the same ecosystem service on adjacent 
parcels.  The opportunity cost of enrolling parcels of type   in the conservation program is 
     . It  is assumed to be the same for all players.  The number of neighbors for the  
   
player is denoted by      Of the    neighbors,     represents the set of neighbors choosing 
strategy  . The payoff function of player   is represented by           . In the game    
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     indicates that player   has opted to place land M(K) in conservation use and      
indicates non-participation. Given this setup, the payoff function for any player   where    
represents the set of neighbors is given by  
 
           {
                             
                                                        
               (1)   
 
 We now make some assumptions to lend a specific structure to the game environment. 
Since, the costs of changing land uses to deliver various ecosystem services on different 
parcels is different, without any loss of generality, we assume that the opportunity cost of 
conservation use on K parcels is higher than on M parcels. Hence the participation payments 
for enrolling K net of opportunity costs are higher than that for enrolling M. This scenario 
represents the costs of producing ecosystem services on marginal cropland which is lower 
than the same from agriculturally fertile tracts. Here the opportunity cost associated with the 
former parcels is lower relative to the latter. Second, the bonus for M parcels is higher than 
that for K. This assumption reflects various institutional criteria related to PES scheme 
implementation. Since PES budgets are limited, the regulator may want to balance a higher 
participation payment for K with a lower bonus payment. The ranking of bonus payments 
may also reflect the agency's preference for procuring ecosystem services from contiguous M 
parcels relative to K ones. Finally, since the participation payment for M parcels is lower than 
that of K, a higher bonus may be necessary to incentivize any enrollment of M parcels at all. 
The third assumption is that absent AB payments, returns from placing land in conservation 
uses is less than that from placing land in conventional uses. This assumption implies that 
landowners don't provide ecosystem services voluntarily. Fourth, there are no transaction 
costs of spatial coordination and participation in the AB scheme. Fifth, net returns inclusive 
of AB payments are higher than placing land solely in conventional uses.  Assumptions four 
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and five together imply that non-participation is a strictly dominated strategy for all players.   
Finally, the agency provides AB payments for only one parcel per landowner so that 
landowners cannot enroll both M and K parcels into the AB scheme.  This last condition 
represents the political constraints facing the agency whereby they have to maximize both 
landowner participation and supply of ecosystem services within the budget constraint. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 To illustrate the features of our AB game, we consider a three player environment. In 
this game              .  Let the AB payments menu be the following - net payments 
from participation be             ,         ,             , and       12. 
Table 1 represents the payoff table and       for all i and      being the two pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium   Also given the coordination game format, these Nash equilibria 
can be payoff ranked with      for all i being Pareto superior to      for all i. In 
addition, since the participation component for M is lower than that for K, higher overall 
payoffs from M can be obtained if and only if the bonuses are earned. Thus  if a player 
believes that at least one of their neighbors might make a mistake and not choose M, 
choosing K is a safer option for them. In other words, by choosing K a player is less reliant 
on their neighbors for their payoffs than if they chose M. Thus payoff-wise K is a less risky 
strategy than M. We can use the Nash equilibrium selection principles of risk and payoff 
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) to formally characterize the riskiness of M relative to 
K. For this we calculate the deviation losses
2
 for the two strategies. In our example, the 
deviation loss for M (25) is less than that associated with K (39).  Thus M and K are 
respectively the payoff dominant and risk dominant strategies
3
. Harsanyi and Selten have 
indicated that since utility is increasing in payoffs, players' collective rationality regarding 
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obtaining higher payoffs will lead them to coordinate on the Pareto efficient payoff dominant 
Nash equilibrium. They however don't focus on the scenario when the deviation loss ofr the 
Pareto superior strategy is lower than that for the other strategies. Subsequent experimental 
evidence by Straub (1995) however established that when the above is the case, the risk 
dominant Nash equilibrium is more likely Intuitively the choice of the risk dominant strategy 
is more likely as  individuals are more inclined to minimize risk and losses in the event of 
coordination failure than maximize their payoffs from coordination. The choice of the risk 
dominant strategy (here K) indicates the failure to coordinate to the economically efficient 
outcome which limits the economic efficiency of the game mechanism (here AB).     
 We have not imposed any local network structure on the strategic environment of the 
above game yet. There are however many studies on coordination games with properties 
similar to our AB game on local networks . Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996) present 
theoretical evidence on the importance of risk dominance as a Nash equilibrium selection 
principle in local networks. Keser et al. (1998) use lab experiments to suggest that the risk 
dominant strategy is more common in local networks relative to global non-network 
environments. Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006, 2008) have focused on equilibrium 
selection and efficiency in local networks with coordination games. Berninghaus et al. (2002) 
have considered the impact of network size on coordination failure in two types of networks – 
circle and lattice. They find a result similar to VHBB’s result - coordination to the payoff 
dominant Nash equilibrium is more common in smaller local networks. However in their 
study, the size treatment is introduced by varying both the number of neighbors and overall 
network size. The change in the number of neighbors represents a change in the clustering 
coefficient and increase in overall group size implies an increase in the characteristic path 
length
4
 of the network. The change in neighbors also indicates that the payoffs are different 
between treatments. By varying these two features, their study does not identify the intrinsic 
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impact of an increase in overall network size on coordination. This reveals a gap in the 
experimental game theoretic literature which we address in our experiments in addition to the 
study of coordination failure in the context of the AB. In our study, we isolate the size impact 
by embedding our three-player coordination game on a six and twelve player local network 
where every individual has two neighbors. We explain the resultant design that we use in our 
experiments and other procedures in the next section.  
Section 3: Experimental Design 
 Experiments were conducted at the Laboratory of Economics, Management and 
Auctions (LEMA) at Penn State University between March and April 2009. All subjects were 
selected from Penn State’s student population. In all experiments subjects played the game 
presented in Table 2. We considered experiments with six and twelve players. The 6 player 
sessions are termed SMALL and the 12 player sessions LARGE.      
Section 3.1: The Spatial Grid 
 The local network constitutes a one dimensional circle presented in Figure 1. On this 
circle for any player             , the set of neighbors is given by     {       }  
For        {   } and for         {     } denote the neighbors. Players on the 
SMALL and LARGE networks have the same number of neighbors so that the clustering 
coefficient is the same (equal to 0). However the larger network has a longer characteristic 
path length.  The smaller circle in the centre of the network indicates that diametrically 
opposite players are not in a player’s local neighborhood.  Every property has two parcels. 
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The interior parcel near the centre is the M and the outer parcel is the K parcel.  Any three 
consecutive players on the spatial grid nests the same coordination game presented in Table 2.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Section 3.2: Experimental Procedure   
 Table 3 presents the experimental design for this study. At the beginning of a session, 
players were shown their positions on the grid and given an ID. The ID identified the players' 
neighbors during the session. The experiment adopted a fixed matching scheme whereby the 
location of a player and their neighbors remained the same throughout the session. This 
scheme was adopted to promote learning from past play and to facilitate reputation building 
and also because on actual landscapes a landowner's neighbors are fixed over time unless they 
change owing to exogenously determined factors. The size variation was introduced as a 
between-subject treatment.   
  Players were provided information about their positions on the local network and 
total number of players in the group.  Instructions explicitly mentioned that a player’s payoffs 
would be directly determined by neighboring players’ actions. We included this information 
as we wanted subjects to understand the difference between the direct and indirect impacts of 
neighbors' and non-neighbors' actions on their own actions. Each experimental session had 
twenty periods during which the game was repeated. The payoff table was visible to players 
whenever they made a decision in a period. Information about neighbors’ choices from all 




INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Players were informed about their role as a landowner whose actions would determine a land 
use outcome. However all other contextual terminology related to ES provision such as 
ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation,  endangered species etc were excluded to 
ensure that subjects responded only to financial incentives. The instructions did not mention 
that land use activity on M parcels is more profitable than on K parcels. This information was 
provided in the payoff table. The subjects participated in a quiz before they started the first 
period. The show up fee was $5 and experimental money earned was converted into actual 
currency at the rate of 35 experimental dollars to one real dollar. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).   
Section 4: Results 
In this paper we consider how increase in overall group size impacts spatial 
coordination in an AB coordination game on a local network. We first analyze outcomes at 
the group/cohort level. Next we discuss results at the level of the local neighborhood of every 
player. The local neighborhood constitutes a player and their neighbors. At the group level, 
we evaluate how overall cohort size and experience with spatial coordination influences 
behavior.  Individual level analysis within players’ local neighborhood provides insights 
about differences in coordination patterns given the local network setting when size of the 
local neighborhood is same across both treatments.   
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Section 4.1: Analysis of Behavior at Cohort Level  
 Figure 2 presents the percentage of M choices by all subjects across time for both the 
treatments. The percentage of M decisions in the first period (in Table 6) is similar in both the 
treatments – 66.67% in the SMALL and 62.5% in the LARGE groups (a chi-squared test 
indicates no significant difference). In the final period the percentage of M decisions is 
64.58% for SMALL and 33.33% for LARGE (this difference is significant at 1% level). 
Considering choices by session, of the eight SMALL sessions there are three where all 
players choose M in Period 20 while in LARGE only one such session exists. Again of the 
eight LARGE sessions, there are three sessions where every individual chooses K in Period 
20 and one session where everyone chooses M. These results suggest that choice of K and 
coordination failure is more common in bigger local networks than smaller ones even if 
players face the same payoffs on both networks. No significant differences in the earlier 
periods' choices imply that subjects initially respond only to the value of payoffs. However, 
the higher degree of anonymity between players (owing to a longer characteristic path length) 
in the larger group causes them to have greater doubts about neighbors' propensity to choose 
M in LARGE relative to SMALL. As a result there is a predominance of the risk dominant 
strategy in LARGE relative to SMALL over time. We can thus conclude that 1) the AB can 
induce spatial coordination to the ecologically beneficial payoff dominant Nash equilibrium 
more often in smaller less anonymous landscapes than in larger ones which have greater 
anonymity. Second, over time coordination causes a decrease in the percentage of payoff 
dominant decisions in LARGE sessions while the value remains stable in SMALL. Finally, in 
the final period of the game in some sessions, players choose M and K and are not able to 
coordinate to a Nash equilibrium outcome. Thus neither an M nor a K convention is obtained 
on the network.  . This outcome is contrary to the past experimental studies on coordination 
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games with varying group sizes such as in VHBB and games considered in Berninghaus et al. 
We refer to this inability of groups to reach a convention as mis-coordination.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 We test the significance of the above results using a probit model with random effects 
to represent the probability of M and K choices for all individuals in any period. We 
investigate how players’ own past period's action,  their experience with coordination and the 
group size impact their probability of choosing M or K in any period. We follow Stewart 
(2006) to estimate an autoregressive random effects probit model given the inclusion of past 
period's value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable. We expect a player's 
choice of M in the preceding period to have a positive impact on the probability of an M 
choice in the current period. This effect indicates a tendency to coordinate to the payoff 
dominant Nash equilibrium to obtain a higher payoff (Berninghaus et al. 2002).  We also 
expect that experience induced by repeated game interactions (controlled by including the 
Period variable) will have a negative impact on probability of M choices in LARGE and a 
positive impact in SMALL, i.e. subjects will be able to coordinate to the payoff dominant 
Nash equilibrium in SMALL and subjects in LARGE sessions will move to the risk dominant 
Nash equilibrium over time. Our chief premise here is that the VHBB outcome will be 
obtained in local networks. In addition, we conjecture that the impact of own choice from the 
past period on current period’s choice will be influenced by how familiar the player is with 
coordination. Thus over time as familiarity with coordination increases, if a player chooses M 
in the preceding period, they are more likely to do so in the current period. Finally we include 
a dummy variable in the analysis to capture the size treatment effect on the probability of M 




                    
               
(                         
(2) 
Here      is the dependent variable taking a value of 1 for every M choice and a 0 for 
every K choice by subjects and is expressed as a function of the treatment dummy  , own 
lagged value      , the Period variable   and an interaction between the Period variable and 
the own lagged value of Action. Since we consider a random effects structure the error term 
comprises of the component    which is the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
associated with every subject i uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model and 
the random component     .
5
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Table 4 presents the estimation results. The constant term is negative and significant 
(at 5%). The dummy estimate is negative and significant (at 1% level). Thus relative to the 
SMALL sessions, the probability of choosing M in LARGE is lower indicating a greater 
incidence of coordination failure. This result extends the size result of VHBB in global 
interaction settings to local networks.   
We obtain a positive and significant (at 1%) estimate for “own action” in the past 
period. This finding is consistent with Warziniack et al. where past period's behavior is found 
to be a significant determinant of strategy choice in the present period. This result is true 
irrespective of the treatment effect. The positive sign captures players' inherent tendencies to 
try to coordinate to the payoff dominant Nash equilibria via their own actions.  
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 We also find that the estimate for the Period variable is negative and significant (1% 
level) suggesting that experience gathered over time has a negative impact on subjects’ 
probability of choosing the payoff dominant strategy. However there is no significant 
downward trend in SMALL and the percentage of M decisions remain constant between 60-
70% in all periods of the game as seen in Figure 2.Thus the estimate picks up the negative 
trend for the LARGE sessions as seen in Figure 2. One reason for no trend in SMALL can be 
the presence of a tension between two effects; the effect of the local network on which greater 
levels of anonymity decreases the probability of M choices and the smaller overall group size 
effect whereby information about coordination behavior in one part of the network is easily 
transmitted to other parts given smaller characteristic path lengths between players increasing 
the probability of M choices. These opposite forces remain during the entire session and 
maintain the percentage of M decisions in SMALL at a stable value around 60%-70% in all 
periods with M conventions attained in three sessions in Period 20. In the LARGE sessions, 
with characteristic path lengths, information transmission along the network is relatively 
harder and the greater anonymity leads to a pre-dominance of K decisions although localized 
M clusters remain. Thus it is very likely that if the number of periods were to increase beyond 
20, the percentage of M decisions in LARGE would fall to zero. 
 Finally the estimate for the interaction term is positive and significant at 1% level. 
This result is contrary to our expectations especially since the estimate for Period is negative. 
The positive sign however indicates that when players have gathered sufficient experience, 
they will try to choose M in the current and future periods if they chose M in the immediate 
past. This behavior supports subjects’ propensity to build up reputation for play of M and their 
tendency to signal neighbors to choose M as well.  
17 
 
Section 4.2: Analysis of Behavior with respect to the Local Neighborhood  
 At the local neighborhood level we investigate behavior of the player and their 
neighbors who together form a cluster.  There are six unique clusters in the SMALL and 
twelve in the LARGE games. Every individual is at the centre of one cluster and at the 
periphery of two others. When all players in a cluster choose the same strategy a Local Nash 
Equilibrium (LNE) is obtained. Let M-LNE denote clusters where all players choose M and 
K-LNE denote those choosing K. For any LNE achieved in a period, the players at the centre 
of the cluster earn Nash equilibrium payoffs and can be considered to be in a Nash 
Equilibrium state. Neighbors on both sides of these players may not be in Nash equilibrium 
states if they are not at the centre of a LNE. For example in a game with five players, consider 
the choice of the central players in three consecutive clusters –                 . 
Here only player 3 in cluster 2 is in a Nash equilibrium state. Player 2 at the centre of cluster 
1 and player 4 at the centre of cluster 3 are in a sub-optimal non NE state. This possibility of a 
sub-optimal state for a player is a consequence of the local network structure with a zero 
clustering coefficient where neighbors of a player are not connected to each other. For players 
in a Nash equilibrium state, unilateral deviation is not beneficial in the next period if they 
conjecture that their neighbors will not change their choices in the next period.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 Figure 3 shows the percentage of M-LNE across periods. We find no significance 
treatment effect on the percentage of M-LNE in the initial periods of the game (established by 
a chi-sq test).  This result contrasts with the findings of VHBB where the size treatment leads 
to significant differences from the onset of the session and choices diverge sharply. This 
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difference in results between our study and that of VHBB can be attributed to the same sized 
local neighborhoods across all sessions. In our study, players face the same payoffs in both 
SMALL and LARGE treatments unlike in VHBB, where number of neighbors and hence 
payoffs are different across small and large groups. Thus, with same sized clusters and 
insufficient experience with coordination, there is no significant difference in behavior on 
networks with varying anonymity levels.  Beyond Period 6 however differences appear in the 
percentages of M-LNEs and the value is consistently greater in SMALL.  In the final period 
of the SMALL games, there are 47.91% M-LNE and 18.75% K-LNE compared to 22.91% 
M-LNE and 53.12% K-LNE in LARGE (this difference is significant at 1% using a chi-sq 
test)
6
. Thus while agents face the same set of payoffs within a cluster on both networks, 
information about creation of M-LNE is transmitted faster within the smaller network relative 
to the larger one leading to a significantly greater percentage of K-LNE in LARGE relative to 
SMALL in the final period.   
 We next focus on the final period choices.  Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996) provide 
theoretical evidence indicating that it is not possible to have agents playing different 
strategies in the final period of a repeated coordination game when they are arranged on a 
circular local network. We however find evidence contrary to this result. We base this result 
on two explanations. First Berninghaus and Schwalbe's theoretical result is predicated on the 
circular network having a clustering coefficient greater than zero. However our circular 
networks are similar to the two dimensional lattice networks which have zero clustering 
coefficients and where multiple conventions co-exist in the final period. Examining the final 
period choices, we find four LARGE and four SMALL sessions where players choose M and 
K strategies in the final period leading to mis-coordination and coexistence of M-LNE and K-
LNE. The presence of M and K choices indicates that there are many players who are in a  
sub-optimal out-of-equilibrium state at the end of the game.  This sub-optimal state refers to 
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the instances of mis-coordination we have mentioned earlier. These results indicate that mis-
coordination is a general feature of networks with zero clustering coefficients which in turn 
implies higher levels of anonymity. Coexistence of multiple strategies with players in a LNE 
state in some sessions however implies localized areas of spatial coordination and partial 
ecological effectiveness of the AB.   We can also use information on the percentage of M-
LNE in the intermediate periods (in Figure 3) to inform our discussion on coordination and 
performance of the AB on local networks. The choice of M by players in intermediate periods 
pertains to voluntary loss making behaviors of players in coordination games. Such behavior 
has been observed in studies by Brandts and Cooper (2006) and reflects players’ tendency to 
influence their neighbors to choose the payoff dominant strategy by establishing their own 
commitment towards that strategy over time. Such performance can lead to coordination and 
improve AB performance. In our experiments, since the percentage of K-LNE is always less 
than 100%, it implies that many players are choosing M in the current period even if both 
their neighbors chose K or one chose M and other K in the previous period However such 
behavior is exhibited by players only when they are caught in between two neighbors 
choosing M and K. If both neighbors continue choosing K, loss-making players switch to K 
as well. In fact considering penultimate and final period choices there are only 3 out of 96 
individuals across all LARGE sessions choosing M when both their neighbors chose K in the 
previous period. We find no individuals in a similar state in SMALL in the final period.  
 Finally we can also use cluster-level analysis to evaluate the economic efficiency of 
the AB in the current environment where coordination failure and mis-coordination co-exist. 
In our setup both whether an M choice was made but also where this choice was located on 
the grid (at the centre of a cluster forming a M-LNE or at the periphery of one not forming a 
M-LNE) determines the economic efficiency of the AB. Let us define an efficiency metric    




   
∑                   ∑                                           
   
   
   




 The denominator is the sum of the total number of shared borders and M-LNE 
possible in any period of the game. The value of both these figures is    . In the numerator, 
   {   }           with      represents an M choice by the  
   player and K 
otherwise. Then the sum of the first two terms is the actual number of shared borders between 
M parcels and the remaining terms is the actual number of M-LNEs in period     
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
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 This metric captures the localized aspect of coordination. For example in the SMALL 
group with     the value of the denominator is 12. On this network, two shared borders 
between players choosing M can be obtained in two ways. First, if three players are adjacent 
to each other and second, if two adjacent players each out of four players are adjacent to each 
other. In the first case the value of the numerator is 3 and         and in the second case 
the value of the numerator is 2 and        . Thus even if we have the same number of 
shared borders and more players choosing to place land M in conservation use, the economic 
effectiveness of the AB is lower since clusters of players are unable to form a M-LNE as 
opposed to the former case where they do. In fact in the first case only 2 players choosing M 
are in a sub-optimal state while in the second case all four players are in sub-optimal state.  
Thus both the number of shared borders and their locations determine the economic 
effectiveness of the AB scheme. Table 5 presents the efficiency values for all sessions for the 
final period. There are three SMALL and 1 LARGE session where efficiency is equal to 1 
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and three LARGE sessions and 1 SMALL session where efficiency is 0. For all other sessions 
the values lie between 0 and 1. A Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test using the final period values 
for    indicates a significant difference in efficiency by treatment at the 10% level of 
significance.  Table 6 and Figure 4 represent the average value of    across all sessions for 
the 20 periods of the game by treatment. We find that between Periods 1 and 5 there is no 
significant difference in the value of the metric between SMALL and LARGE. Beyond this 
period however the average value of the metric rises from 44% in Period 6 to 52% in Period 
20 in SMALL and falls from 42% to 23% in the final period in LARGE. Thus over time 
incidence of spatial coordination failure rises and performance of the AB falls in LARGE 
relative to SMALL groups.  
Section 5: Conclusion 
 This paper provides experimental evidence on the performance of the AB in small and 
large landscapes arranged on local networks of varying size. In addition the local network 
refinement allows us to consider spatial coordination in a strategic environment which is 
similar to real working landscapes where strategic interactions between landowners are limited 
by geography and where their neighbors’ identity and number may vary. We obtain two key 
results. First, there are fewer instances of coordination to the ecologically superior payoff 
dominant Nash equilibrium in bigger cohorts than in smaller ones.  Second, in the presense of 
strategic uncertainty in the coordination game environment, variation in the size of the local 
network gives rise to mis-coordination in the final period of the AB games. This mis-
coordination has greater incidence in LARGE than in SMALL. 
 The question of whether mis-coordination and coordination failure will persist on real 
landscapes with actual landowners requires field experimentation. Since the presence of 
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anonymity owing to lower levels of clustering on the local networks drives coordination 
outcomes in our study, a way to promote coordination on real landscapes would be to reduce 
this anonymity.  Since geographical configurations of properties and social ties/connections 
within farming communities are predetermined to some extent, external interventions are 
necessary to reduce anonymity levels for landowners and promote coordination behavior to 
improve the AB's performance. Interactions with university extension personnel, regular 
meetings of watershed groups (who make many conservation decisions especially with respect 
to water quality trading and reduction in nutrient runoff) etc can enable landowners to learn 
about the importance of spatial coordination and their neighbors actions and attitudes towards 
ecosystem service protection and spatially coordinated land management.  Additionally, 
landowners with pro-conservation attitudes can also promote coordinated participation of their 
neighbors by acting as responsible environmental stewards and continually signing up in the 
scheme regardless of their neighbors' decisions. Although these stewards don’t earn the bonus, 
their commitment to conservation signal their willingness to coordinate spatially and over time 





Thank you for participating in today's experiment. You have been provided with a sheet which has 
your unique participant number for this experiment. This is your ID. This number is private and 
should not be shared with anyone. Please enter your ID before continuing. Please enter the number 
exactly as it appears on your sheet. 
 
General Information:  
This is an experiment in decision making. In today's experiment you will participate in a group 
decision task which involves choosing between two actions. In addition to a $5 participation fee, you 
will be paid the money you accumulate from your choices which will be described to you in a 
moment. Upon the completion of the experiment, your earnings will be added up and you will be paid 
privately, in cash. The exact amount you will receive will be determined during the experiment and 
will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. From this point forward all units of account 
will be in experimental dollars. At the end of the experiment, experimental dollars will be converted 
to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 U.S. dollars for every 35 experimental dollars. If you have any 
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questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment and may not be 
paid. 
 
Group Decision Task: 
The experiment will have twenty periods. In each period you will be in a group with 11 other 
participants. During this experiment each of you will assume the role of a landowner who has two 
kinds of parcels on their property denoted by M and K. You will receive payoffs from managing the 
land on any of these parcels. All the players including you are arranged around a circular grid which is 
shown in the handout that you have been provided. This grid represents the landscape on which your 
properties are located. On this grid every parcel is marked by M or K. The number attached to both M 
and K denotes subject ID. Thus if your ID is 8, then parcels M8 and K8 constitute your property.  
On this grid you have two neighbors, one on each side. The hole in the centre indicates that the player 
diametrically opposite to you is not your neighbor. Your neighbors will be the same in all periods. 
You will never know the identity of your neighbors. Your ID will determine who your neighbors are. 
Please keep in mind that every player has a different set of neighbors. Thus if you are player 11 then 
your neighbors are players 10 and 12. Player 12 has you and player 1 as neighbors.  
 
In each period, each one of you will make a choice between managing parcel M and parcel K. You 
will each receive money based on your choice and the choices of your neighbors. In a moment we will 
give you a detailed description of your choices and how your payment will be determined. Please 
raise your hand if there are any questions otherwise click "Continue" 
 
Your Payment from Group Decision Task: 
In each period of the experiment, the computer will display the table shown below. This table is the 
same for everyone and is the same for all periods of this experiment. The amounts shown in the table 
reflect the possible payments you might receive for that period, based on your choice and the choices 
of your neighbors. Each number in the table corresponds to a payment (in experimental dollars) 
resulting from a possible combination of your choice (row) and your neighbors' choices (column). 
Your choice of strategy M corresponds to your position on the grid on the parcel marked by M and 
your ID. Your choice of strategy K corresponds to your position on the parcel marked by K and your 
ID. Please take a moment to look over the table. Whenever you are making a choice, you will be able 
to see this table. Your payoff depends upon your management decision (M or K) and that of your two 
neighbors. In general, your payoff increases when you manage the same parcels. 
 
Making a choice in a period:  
Once the period starts, each of you will choose a strategy (M or K) by clicking on one of the buttons 
that will appear on the right of your screen.  You may change your choice as often as you like, but 
once you click on OK your choice for that period is final. Note that when you are making your 
choice, you will not know the choices of others. Also, remember that you will never know the identity 
of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are confidential and that no one will ever know 
what choices you make. 
At the end of each period, your screen will display your strategy and the choices of other players, your 
payment for the current period, your neighbors' payments and your accumulated payment through the 
current period. At the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payments from all 
twenty periods. This will be paid to you privately in cash. We are now ready to begin the experiment. 
On the next screen you will participate in a quiz. Please note that this is a non-paying period and your 
answers in this quiz will not influence your payoffs at the end of the experiment. 
 
Quiz (non-paying period): 
Before we begin the experiment, we would like you participate in the quiz below. Your answers 
should be based on the payoff table shown. Please raise your hand if you are having trouble answering 




Suppose one of your neighbors plays strategy M and the other plays strategy K. Then your payoff 
from playing strategy M is?             18 
My neighbor has the same neighbors as I do.                  FALSE 
Your neighbors change in every period.                   FALSE 
What is your payoff when you chose K and all your neighbors chose M?            27 
 
We are now ready to begin the experiment. On the next screen you will be able to see the payoff table. 
Please make a choice. You will be paid on the basis of all the choices you make henceforth. 
 
How to read the Results Table: 
On the next screen you will be able to see two tables. The first table records your and your neighbors' 
choices for the present period. Your choice is in the cell at the centre of the table. Your neighbors' 
choices are recorded in cells on your left and right. The second table is the History Table and records 
your choices and those of your neighbors for all periods of this experiment. It also shows your profit 
for the present period as well as your total profit across all periods. Please raise your hand if there are 
any questions otherwise click "Continue" 
 
Screen Shots and Z-TREE files are available upon request. 
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M 50 30 10 
K 25 37 49 
 










M 36 18 0 
K 27 24 21 
 
Table 3 Experimental Design 
 
 Treatment 
 SMALL LARGE 
Number of sessions 8 8 
Number of players in a 
session 
6  12  




$5 show up fee 









Table 4 Estimates of Dynamic Random Effects Probit Regression 
 
 
* represents 1% level of significance, ** represents 5% level of significance 
 



















SMALL 0.41 0.41 0.25 0 1 1 0.08 1 













Dependent Variable Probability of Choosing M 
Independent Variable 
Estimate 
















# of Observations 2736 




Table 6 Percentage of Average M Decisions, M-LNE and Efficiency Levels 
 
 % M Choices % M-LNE 
 
% Efficiency 
Period SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
1 66.7 62.5 29.2 32.3 37.5 35.4 
2 66.7 58.3 39.6 34.4 44.8 39.1 
3 62.5 58.3 29.2 33.3 35.4 37.5 
4 58.3 58.3 27.1 35.4 33.3 37.5 
5 62.5 64.6 39.6 34.4 44.8 42.2 
6 62.5 54.2 37.5 29.2 44.8 34.9 
7 68.8 54.2 45.8 28.1 51.0 33.3 
8 70.8 52.1 58.3 30.2 57.3 32.8 
9 62.5 56.3 41.7 30.2 47.9 36.5 
10 64.6 49.0 50.0 26.0 54.2 30.2 
11 66.7 44.8 56.3 26.0 58.3 29.7 
12 66.7 44.8 54.2 26.0 57.3 28.6 
13 60.4 49.0 47.9 25.0 51.0 29.7 
14 64.6 44.8 56.3 24.0 58.3 26.6 
15 62.5 39.6 52.1 20.8 54.2 24.5 
16 66.7 40.6 52.1 20.8 54.2 24.0 
17 60.4 35.4 35.4 19.8 41.7 22.9 
18 64.6 35.4 50.0 20.8 53.1 23.4 
19 70.8 35.4 58.3 21.9 61.5 24.5 






Figure 1: Spatial Grid for the Experiments 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of M Choices 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of M Clusters 
 






                                                     
1
 In the Parkhurst and Shogren study, N=4 and every individual has 25 parcels on their properties 
which they can enrol in the AB. Thus there are potentially numerous landuse configurations which can be 
created under the scheme of which only one is the Pareto superior one.  
2
 In a coordination game, the deviation loss associated with a strategy is the loss from choosing that 
strategy when all other opponents choose another strategy. 
3
 The payoff dominant Nash equilibrium is the high risk high paying Pareto superior Nash equilibrium 
and the risk dominant Nash equilibria are the low risk low paying Nash equilibria in a coordination game.  
4
 The clustering coefficient represents the extent to which a player's neighbors are connected with each 
other. The characteristic path length is the average distance between pairs of individuals in the network (Jackson 
2008). The extent to which responses of individuals in one part of the network is transmitted to the other is a 
function of this characteristic path length. Smaller local networks usually have smaller characteristic path 
lengths than bigger ones since on an average one has to pass more individuals to reach another individual in a 
bigger network than in a smaller one. These two features together influence the degree of anonymity between 
individuals in the network and hence propensity to coordinate in coordination games (Berninghaus and 
Schwalbe 1996).  
5
 We find no significant difference in the variability in the number of neighbors making an M choice in 
any period between SMALL and LARGE (standard deviation for SMALL is 0.79 and for LARGE is 0.8). 
Consequently, we did not include the variable representing number of M decisions by neighbors’ from the 
preceding period in the analysis.  
6
 M-LNE and K-LNE figures don’t add up to 100% since some players at the centre of clusters are in a 
sub-optimal state with both their neighbors choosing different strategies or strategies different from the players 
